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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT AND
-
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-

-

•

'

-

'

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This is an appeal from a summary judgment of the District
Court for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson,
Judge, presiding.

On cross motions for summary judgment, Judge

Wilkinson ruled that certain real property in Salt Lake County,
Utah, to which appellants (Conrad G. Maxfield and Utah National
Corporation) hold record title, is owned by respondents Ainsworth
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based upon the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.

Jurisdic-

tion is vested in the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to §78-22(3) (i) Utah Code Ann., and by virtue of the restrictions to the
Court of Appeals under §78-2a-3, and pursuant to 3(a) of the
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
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The issues presented by this appeal are:
1.

Whether the undisputed material facts as shown by those

statements in the affidavits which would be admissible in
evidence if offered at trial, and other matters in the record
properly considered, establish that the respondents Ainsworth are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on the doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence, and if so, the precise location of
those boundaries.
2.

Whether the undisputed material facts as shown by those

statements in the affidavits which would be admissible in
evidence if offered at trial, and other matters in the record
properly considered, establish that the appellants Maxfield and
Utah National Corporation are entitled to judgment as a matter of
law based on record title and the absence of boundary by
acquiescence.
3.

Whether there is any genuine issue as to a material fact

respecting the existence or non existence of boundary by acquiescence, e.g. issues relating to the location of such alleged

b^ndaries, issues respecting whether or not there was a dispute
or uncertainty as to the true boundary line measured against an
objective test, etc.
NOTE:

The issues cannot be defined more precisely than

above at this time inasmuch as there are no findings of fact and
the summary judgment entered by the District Court is not
specific as to reasons or facts relied upon for the summary
judgment.

Although various arguments and facts were suggested in

the summary judgment proceedings, it is unknown which, if any,
were relied on by the lower court.

Without such information, to

speculate or to list every potential item mentioned in the record
as a possibility would unduly burden this brief.

Perhaps when

respondents' brief is filed it will suggest specific reasons and
facts they believe support the summary judgment, thereby more
precisely delineating the issues.
Notwithstanding the general nature of the above issues and
the lack of information referred to, appellants believe that the
specific common denominator running through all possible issues,
including those above and any others which may be raised by
respondents, is the question of whether the respondents have met
the element of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence which
requires the existence of a dispute or uncertainty as to the true
boundary line measured against an objective test.

If this

prerequisite element has not been met, as appellants urge, under
the precedents cited hereafter the summary judgment should be
reversed and the appellants restored to their record title as a
matter of law.

DETERMINATIVE RULE;

RULE 56(c) and (e)

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

The portions of the rule relevant to this appeal are as
follows:
(c)

"....[T]he judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith

if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
(e)

"Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on

personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that affiant
is competent to testify to the matters stated therein."

STATEMENT
n n i •>•• • OF
• • •THE
— • f c » —CASE
u—————

This case involves four large parcels of land (several acres
each) in Salt Lake County which are adjacent to each other in a
north to south 1,2,3,4 fashion, located west of 300 West Street
and east of the Rio Grande railroad tracks between about 9400
South Street and 10000 South Street.

From north to south, the

first parcel is owned by appellants (herein referred to as
Maxfield or parcel 1), the second parcel is owned by respondents
Ainsworth (herein referred to as Ainsworth or parcel 2 ) , the

third parcel is owned by respondent Staker (herein referred to as
Staker or parcel 3 ) , and the fourth parcel is owned by the
Jensens and the Holmes (herein referred to as Jensen/Holmes or
parcel 4). Within the third parcel is a small parcel owned by
respondents Yocom (herein referred to as Yocom), and within the
fourth parcel is a small parcel owned by respondents Shane
(herein referred to as Shane).

The following diagram is not

drawn to scale, but is for illustration purposes only:

«~N
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In 1985, S t a k e r ( p a r c e l 3) sued Ainsworth and J e n s e n / H o l m e s ,
t h e n e i g h b o r i n g landowners t o t h e n o r t h and t o t h e s o u t h ,
( p a r c e l s 2 and 4 , r e s p e c t i v e l y )

in Case No. C-85-2883 (R. 2 - 7 ) .
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The suit was brought because Staker had discovered that the fence
lines separating his parcel from both parcel 2 (Ainsworth) and
parcel 4 (Jensen/Holmes) did not correspond with survey lines,
and it was therefore necessary to determine the true boundaries
(R. 5 ) . Subsequently, Ainsworth (parcel 2) sued Maxfield (parcel
1) for the same reason, that is, the fence lines between parcel 1
and parcel 2 were also inconsistent with the survey lines (C855024, R. 2-4). 1

The second lawsuit was Case No. C85-5024, and

during the course of the litigation, the two cases were consolidated (C85-5024, R. 17-18).

The record doesn't say why, but it

was apparently because of the similarity in the situations of the
four parcels, i.e., all had discrepancies between the fence lines
and the survey lines.
Respondents Shane and Yocom were brought into the litigation
because of the effect a ruling in favor of the record title or
the fence lines may have upon them (R. 2-7). The fence lines are
north (and west in the case of the Yocom/Staker north/south
boundary) of the survey lines on all of the parcels, although not
the same distance on each one.
The lower court, upon cross motions for summary judgment by
the parties, granted summary judgment in favor of the fence lines
and against the record titles on all properties, that is, the

1

All references to the record prefaced by C85-5024 refer to
the separately numbered file for the action consolidated with the
Staker action on March 3, 1986.
-£-

court ruled that boundary by acquiescence is established as a
matter of law (R. 200-202).

It is to be noted that although the

consolidated caes involved all four large parcels plus the two
small parcels in parcels 3 and 4, Maxfield (parcel 1) is the only
party who has appealed, and therefore the boundary between parcel
1 and parcel 2 is the only boundary being appealed herein (it
being readily apparent that Maxfield is the only party to lose
ground to which he has record title which is not substantially
offset by gains under the lower court's boundary by acquiescence
ruling, i.e. since the fences are north of the survey lines, the
north property (parcel 1) loses ground, the two middle properties
(parcels 2 and 3) come out about even, and the south property
(parcel 4) gains by the court's adoption of the fence lines over
record title).
Numerous affidavits were filed in connection with the
summary judgment motions.

Many of the statements in the affi-

davits are controverted by statements in other affidavits and
much of the material in the affidavits does not comply with Rule
56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, respecting admissibility in
evidence and other requirements.

Inasmuch as the lower court did

not recite any facts in its summary judgment ruling (R.199, 200202), it is unknown which of the controverted facts or other
facts alleged in the affidavits were accepted by the court and on
what basis the decision was made to hold as a matter of law that
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence applied to defeat the
record title.
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Neverthelessr the pertinent facts that are not in dispute
are as follows:
1.

That Maxfield (parcel 1) is the record owner of the

parcel of land in dispute which is the subject of this appeal,
which parcel is approximately 83 feet of frontage on 300 West
Street and 960 feet deep, containing about one and three quarters
acres of land.
2.

That generally

speaking, the said disputed property has

historically been enclosed within the fences of the Ainsworth
parcel (parcel 2 ) .

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Appellants believe that the lower court's summary decision
that the fence lines are superior to the record title constitutes
misapplication of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence and
iscontrary to the clear rules of established precedent.

It is

the position of the appellants herein (Maxfield, parcel 1) that
proper application of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
requires a reversal of the judgment below and a ruling of summary
judgment in favor of the record title (Maxfield, parcel 1).

z

The term "generally" is used because the location of the
fence has been changed from time to time over many years to
accommodate the erosion and changing courses of an adjacent
watercourse (R. 182-185).

-R-

Essentially, Maxfield's argument for reversal and judgment
in his favor as a matter of law is that the 1984 Utah Supreme
Court cases of Halliday v. Cluff, 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984),
Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360 (Utah 1984), and Parsons v.
Anderson, 690 P.2d 535 (Utah 1984), require that before the
Ainsworths (parcel 2) can wrest away the record title from
Maxfield (parcel 1) on the basis of boundary by acquiescence,
they must establish all the prerequisite elements set out in
those cases. The affidavits relied on by Ainsworth to establish
the elements of boundary by acquiescence fall short of that
requirement, and this is so, even if they are believed in total
and the controverting affidavits ignored.

The primary reason is

that there is nothing in the record to establish the necessary
element known as the "objective uncertainty" requirement, to-wit:
...[T]hat during the period of acquiescence there was some
circumstance in the record title or in the reasonably
available survey information (or other technique by which
record title information was located on the ground) that
would have prevented a landowner, as a practical matter,
from being reasonably certain about the true location of
the boundary. Halliday v. Cluff, supra, at 505 and
Stratford v. Morgan, supra, at 364.
The affidavits filed in support of the summary judgment
contain only immaterial, speculative and conjectural phrases such
as, "may have," "it appears that," "it is my understanding that,"
(R. 194-195) "which I have been told," (R. 114) or otherwise
allegations that are without foundation or involve other inadmissible matters.

A complete reading of all of the affidavits
-9-

and other materials in the record produces the inescapable
conclusion that adequate correct survey information has always
been reasonably available, that no one really knows why the
fences weren't put on the proper lines, and that any suggestions
to the contrary are mere conjecture and speculation.

There is no

showing that the fence lines in the wrong place arose out of a
dispute or uncertainty measured by an objective standard as
required by the cases mentioned above, and this is true even if
all of the admissible facts are as represented by the Ainsworths
in the affidavits on file.

Therefore, the claim of boundary by

acquiescence fails as a matter of law, the record title of
Maxfield (parcel 1) should be reinstated, and the judgment of the
lower court should be reversed.
Appellants' alternative argument is that in any event the
material alleged in respondents' affidavits has been sufficiently
controverted in the affidavits submitted by Maxfield as to show
genuine issues of material facts within the meaning of Rule 56 of
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure respecting respondents' claims, and
therefore it was error for the lower court to grant the summary
judgment depriving Maxfield of a trial of the issues.

By way of

clarification, it is appellants' position that there are no such
issues that would stand in the way of a summary judgment for
appellants1 record title, but there are several to prevent the
summary judgment of the lower court stripping appellants of their
record title.
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ARGUMENT

POINT I.

THE LOWER COURT'S RULING IS A MISAPPLICATION OF THE
DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE AND IS CONTRARY TO
ESTABLISHED PRECEDENT. CORRECT APPLICATION OF THE
DOCTRINE AND PRECEDENTS REQUIRES THE SUSTAINING OF THE
RECORD TITLE AND REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT BELOW AS A
MATTER OF LAW.

In 1984 the Utah Supreme Court decided three cases where
parties attempted to establish title to land on the basis of
boundary by acquiescence.

These are cited on page 9, above. The

Court's opinion in the first of these, Hallidvay v. Cluff, supra,
pointed to some historical confusion and uncertainty in the law
regarding the legal doctrines of boundary by acquiescence and
boundary by agreement, and it clarified the law in that regard.
It also discussed important policy considerations and emphasized
that the law clearly gives precedence to record title over fence
lines.
The issues in the Halliday case are stated by the Court on
page 501 of the opinion as:
1.

"...whether a showing of uncertainty or dispute on the

location of a boundary line is necessary to the application of
boundary by acquiescence, ... "
2.

"...if so, what is meant by 'uncertainty'", and

3.

"...who has the burden of proving it."

The Court answered "yes" to the first question.

To the

second question, it made it very clear that the uncertainty
required cannot be subjective, but should be measured against an

-11-

objective test (685 P.2d at 505). In answer to the third
question, the burden of proof was placed squarely upon the party
seeking to displace another's record title (685 P.2d at 507).
The following are the words of the court in answer to these three
questions:
1.

At page 504,
...we have concluded from the more recent cases
and from the clear weight of authority that the
relevance of this ingredient [a showing of
uncertainty or dispute] is settled in our law.

2.

At page 505,
...[we] hold that 'dispute1 is not proved by
mere difference of opinion, and 'uncertainty' is
not proved by a mere lack of knowledge of the
true location of the boundary.... Finally, the
ingredient that has been called 'dispute or
uncertainty' should be measured against an
objective test of reasonableness and should
therefore more appropriately be called
'objective uncertainty'.

See also material quoted from the opinion on page 9, above.
3.

At page 507,
...we hold that the party claiming boundary by
acquiescence has the burden of proving objective
uncertainty as part of the prima facie elements
of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.

It is respectfully submitted that the above constitutes the
applicable law in this appeal, that the Halliday case is on "all
fours" with the present case, and that respondents have wholly
failed in their burden to establish any "objective uncertainty"
as it is defined in the above referenced decisions.
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It is obvious from all of the affidavits and other portions
of the record below that a long time ago fences in the area were
not placed on the true boundary lines, but were placed at significant and varying distances away from them.

The question is why?

A possible answer to the question is suggested in Maxfield's
(parcel 1) answer to Ainsworth's (parcel 2) complaint:

That the

fence separating parcels 1 and 2 was placed not as boundary, but
as protection against livestock falling into a dangerous watercourse (C85-5024, R. 7 ) . The evidence in support of this proposed explanation is the lay of the land, that is, the steepness
of the embankment, the obvious danger to animals, etc., suggests
that the fence must have been erected to prevent livestock from
hurting themselves.

Nevertheless, this may not have been the

reason the fence was erected in that location, that is, there is
no direct evidence or an eyewitness, and the original fences were
constructed so long ago (possibly as far back as the 1890's
according to some of the affidavits) (R. 117, 119) that no one
today knows how the locations for them were determined.
The livestock protection explanation is mentioned in this
brief not to conclusively establish it as the correct answer, but
to show that such explanation is at least as plausable as any
other proposed explanation, and it serves to emphasize that one's
guess is as good as another's, or in other words, no one really
knows.

The bottom line is simply this:

There isn't anything in

the record that establishes why the fences were erected where

-13-

they were, and therefore, a fortiori, there is nothing in the
record establishing any objective uncertainty concerning such.
In Stratford v. Morgan, supra, at 363-364, the following words of
the court are equally applicable to the facts in this appeal:
The mere fact that a fence happens to be put up
and neither party does anything about it for a
long period of time will not establish it as the
true boundary.

Not only is there nothing in the affidavits, or other
appropriate portions of the record, to establish that there has
ever at any time been any dispute or objective uncertainty, but
statements of respondents' counsel in the oral arguments at the
summary judgment hearing are tantamount to an admission on
respondents' part that no such information is in the record nor
could be.
Four times the District Judge asked respondents' counsel to
say when the dispute first arose (presumably to establish a
beginning point for the dispute or uncertainty in order to determine if the requisite number of years had elapsed), and four
times counsel was unable to give an answer that would show any
dispute or objective uncertainty during the claimed period of
acquiescence (R. 250, 253, 262, 263, 292). It is understandable
that counsel would not be able to pinpoint the time of a dispute
or uncertainty measured by an objective standard at any time
during the alleged period of acquiescence inasmuch as, as has
been pointed out above, none ever existed.

-14-

In attempting to

suggest something (possible early erroneous surveys) that could
constitute an objective uncertainty, counsel appears to be
invoking the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
for itself") (R. 245, lines 7-14).

("The thing speaks

That is, counsel appears to

be arguing that a dispute or uncertainty and the existence of
erroneous surveys are obvious or otherwise they wouldn't have put
the fences in the wrong place, built the houses, etc.
surveys have been produced.

But no

Even if there had been early surveys

(as opposed to conjecture on respondents' part) there is no showing that they would have been based on any objective uncertainty.
As stated above, respondents admitted at the summary judgment hearing in the lower court that they have no information:
"... they (the fences) apparently were set to a survey
that was erroneous, and even if that wasn't the case,
..." (emphasis added) (R. 254).
"We don't have anything before us to tell us on what
basis that home was set." (R. 254).
"...but how they get a survey to determine that is on
their property we are not able to know at this point."
(emphasis added! (iT. 259).
"I have to assume" a survey was completed (R. 293).

These statements on behalf of respondents admit the obvious,
which is that nobody knows why the fences were set where they
were set.

Again, as stated in the Halliday case, uncertainty is

not proved by a mere lack of knowledge of the true location of
the boundary.

In direct contrast to the speculation and "the thing speaks
for itself" type of arguments adopted by those seeking to establish boundary by acquiescence without showing any objectively
measureable uncertainty, appellants (Maxfield) have followed
exactly the requisites laid down in Halliday;
...[T]he record landowner may, of course,
conclusively negate the existence of objective
uncertainty by proving that the claimant or his
predecessors in title had reasons to know the
location of the true boundary before the
expiration of the period of acquiescence.
Halliday v. Cluff, supra, at 507.
The affidavit of Robert B. Jones stands uncontroverted.

It

states that the monuments presently in place, from which a survey
would be taken to survey the subject properties, have been in
place in the same location and reasonably available for any
surveyor since 1856 (R. 176). In other words, referring to the
quoted material from the Halliday opinion on page 9 of this
brief, there is nothing that would have prevented a landowner as
a practical matter from being reasonably certain about the true
location of the boundary.

Therefore, the record shows in this

appeal, that the record owners (Maxfield, parcel 1) have, as
quoted above, conclusively negated the existence of objective
uncertainty.
Certainly it is possible that, as respondents suggest, there
could have been an erroneous survey, or even more than one, back
in the 1890's when the house and the fences were first established, in 1920 as claimed (see discussion below), or any other time.

-16-

But there is no proof of any such surveysf and at best the
affidavits of respondents' surveyor witnesses as to the existence
of a survey are without foundation and are based on inadmissible
evidence (R. 163-165, 167-170).

But even if there were any

applicable erroneous surveys, because the monuments have been in
place since 1856, such survey(s) could not have been based on any
objective uncertainty, whether there were mistakes in them or
not.
As eluded to in the Statement of Issues above, perhaps
respondents' brief will specify in what ways they feel they have
met the objective uncertainty test.

Until that happens, however,

it may be well to mention some of the major points respondents
relied upon in their arguments before the lower court:
The Rojck survey.

Respondents claim one Mr. Rock may have

surveyed many properites in the general area in 1920 and that
these surveys were erroneous (R. 163-165).

Appellants understand

respondents' argument to be that this is an objectively
measureable circumstance within the meaning of the Halliday
decision based on footnote 7 on page 507, which states among
other things:

"To cite only one example a boundary located on a

surveyed line could qualify for boundary by acquiescence, even
though a subsequent survey showed the original survey to have
been in error." (685 P.2d 507, footnote 7 ) . There are at least
three good reasons why that argument cannot be upheld:

-17-

1. There is no proof this survey ever occurred.

No one has

produced it, and it is only conjecture that such was ever done on
any of the four parcels mentioned above (R. 169). Neither of the
two surveyors who filed affidavits on behalf of respondents have
shown in their affidavits that their comments about this alleged
survey are based on their own personal knowledge as required by
Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

They have used terms

such as "may have" and "Rock and/or other surveyors" (R. 193195), clearly indicating that they don't know whether this
occurred or not.

In fact, subsequent to filing his affidavit,

one of them was asked whether he knew it on his own personal
knowledge and he said he did not (R. 169).
Therefore, point 1 is that it is not established, nor could
it be, that this survey of the properties ever occurred.

As

further proof of this is the fact that the discrepancies in the
boundaries between the parcels involved in the consolidated cases
are not consistent with each other or with the explanation given
by the respondents' affidavits as to why the error was made. The
surveyors' affidavits say, for example, that Mr. Rock used the
witness monument which is east and north of the true monument,
and that's the reason for the mistake (R. 194). It is true that
this would explain why the fences are generally north of the true
boundaries, but the Staker survey, a rough drawing of which is
attached to the Staker complaint, shows that the Yocom fence is
west of the true boundary (R. 7 ) , when in fact if Rock had used

the witness monument as claimed by the affidavits, this line
would be east.

This is conclusive proof that the mistake in

setting the fences for this residence was not the result of a
survey using the witness monument instead of the real one.

As

further proof of this is the fact that the distances between the
fences and the deed lines shown on the diagram on page 5 of this
brief vary between 75 feet and 88 feet.

If Mr. Rock really

surveyed these properties in 1920 as suggested, one would expect
the discrepancies to be more uniform.

They aren't even uniform

within each parcel, e.g. the discrepancy on the disputed property
in this appeal is 80.86 feet on the west and 83.39 feet on the
east. (C85-5024, R. 3)
2.

Even if there had been such an erroneous survey, it

could not have been the basis for the setting of the fences in
the wrong places inasmuch as all of the relevant affidavits
indicate that the fences and the house were in place long before
1920 (R. 116-117, 119). The fact that the fences were already
there prior to 1920 is a further indication of the probability
that the properties were not surveyed in 1920 as claimed (no need
to if the fences were already established, even if Rock had
surveyed other surrounding areas).
3.

In any event, assuming there was such a thing as the

erroneous Rock survey in 1920, it couldn't possibly qualify under
the

Halliday opinion as an objective uncertainty.

Clearly,

respondents' arguments have missed the point of footnote 7 to the
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Halliday opinion, quoted above.

It roust be read in light of the

holding of the court in the main opinion, and it should not be
overlooked that the word "could" is in italics, i.e., it doesn't
say an erroneous survey "is" or "does" qualify for boundary by
acquiescence, only that it could.

Regardless of whether it is a

survey or some other objectively roeasureable circumstance, the
key word is still "objectivity."

That is, an erroneous survey

could qualify, but to be consistent with the main holding in the
case, it could qualify only if the error in the survey was based
on something objective which would necessarily prevent a correct
survey.
Suppose a surveyor committed some errors in addition and as
a result a boundary line was set several feet from its correct
location.

Is that objective?

Obviously not.

This is because

objective means that someone else trying to duplicate it would
necessarily encounter the same problem.
monument theory advanced by respondents?

How about the witness
If the surveyor puts

the boundary in the wrong place because he mistakenly started
from the wrong place (the witness monument instead of the real
monument), is that objective?

Of course not, itfs subjective the

same as the addition error, and the next day a survey starting
from the correct monument would produce a correct survey, that
is, there is no lack of "reasonably available survey information"
as required by the three 1984 cases cited above and quoted on
page 9 of this brief.
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Obviously, whether it be because of lack of experience or
because of not being careful at the time, the surveyor's decision
to use the wrong monument is totally subjective, and therefore
respondents1 argument fails totally.

In fact, the claim of

respondents' that Mr. Rock started his survey in the wrong place
is exactly like the facts of the Halliday case.

It was pointed

out in the Halliday opinion (with much less conjecture) that the
fence line was established by measuring from the wrong side of
the road.

The Court had no difficulty in determining that that

was not an objective problem and ruling that therefore there was
no boundary by acquiescence.
The Shane home.

In the lower court respondents have argued

strenuously that somehow the fact that the true survey boundary
disects the Shane home is a very important factor in this case.
That such is not a factor in this appeal is seen from the following obvious reasons:
1.

Neither Shane nor Staker nor Holmes/Jensen (being all of

the parties affected by the boundaries around the house) have
appealed the decision of the lower court. Therefore, whether the
judgment of the lower court was right or wrong with respect to
those boundaries, it hasn't been questioned by those it affects.
2.

Even if the Shane boundary had been appealed and were at

issue, it would not be relevant to the boundary dispute between
parcel 1 and parcel 2 about which this appeal concerns.

The

Shane property is several hundred feet and three unrelated
parcels to the south of the property in dispute in this appeal,
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and although there may be some similarity in the problems of both
pieces, it is still a different case.
3,

In any event, the fact that someone built a house over

the top of a property boundary line in the 1890's doesn't prove
anything about whether or not there was a dispute or objective
uncertainty.

It may show that the builders thought they were

building within the boundary, but that is all.

It doesn't show

any dispute or any uncertainty measured by an objective
standard.

They just made a mistake, that's all.

As respondents'

counsel has stated, "We don't have anything before us to tell us
on what basis that home was set." (R. 254).
4.

In Roman v. Ries, 66 Cal. Rptr. 120 (Calif. 1968), the

court exercised equitable powers to give the owner of a house
built on another's land "the portion of land reasonably required
in order that they will not suffer substantial loss by reliance
upon the (mistaken) boundary line."
rest.

The owner of record got the

This approach would be a much preferable solution to the

problem of the Shane home being on the boundary line than to the
disturbing all of the record titles all the way to 9400 South
Street.

POINT II.

THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE RECORD TITLE IN VIEW OF THE
EXISTENCE OF GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS.

As stated above under Point I, appellants do not believe
there are any issues relating to material facts which would
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prevent the court from granting summary judgment reinstating the
record title in appellants (Maxfield, parcel 1) as a matter of
law.

However, there are many such issues to prevent a ruling as

a matter of law the other way, as was done by the lower court in
granting summary judgment that boundary by acquiescence had been
established.
Numerous issues have been referred to above in connection
with the discussion of whether or not there really was a Rock
survey or any other survey, why the fences were placed where they
were, etc. as they relate to the issue of respondents meeting
their burden of establishing an objective uncertainty necessary
to prevail on their claim of boundary by acquiescence*
Additional issues exist with respect to parcel 1 and parcel
2 which may not exist with respect to the other properties in the
consolidated cases, and these are related to the precise location
of the alleged boundary and whether there ever could have been a
boundary up to a line certain in view of the constantly changing
fence line because of the changing watercourse (R. 184). See
dissent in Parsons v^ Anderson, supra at 540. As mentioned
above, appellants have alleged that the fence was built to
protect livestock from the dangerous and steep watercourse.
Appellants would seek an opportunity to present evidence of such
to a trier of fact in a trial of the matter and believe that the
lay of the land, i.e., the steepness and danger presented as
described in Maxfield's affidavit, along with the history of the
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last decade and half known to Maxfield and his observation of the
condition existing then indicating that the fence has been moved
to protect cattle as the erosion has moved north, would show
substantial issues respecting this point.

The Maxfield affidavit

definitely establishes that the present fence line is not in the
location as shown in the metes and bounds call based on the
recent survey of Ainsworth as cited in Ainsworth's complaint,
e.g. the 15 or 20 foot jog is not consistent with the calls
therein (R. 167-170, 184, and C85-5024 R. 2-4).

CONCLUSION

The fence lines involved in this case were probably established as long ago as the 1890's. Whether it be the result of
the influence of this lengthy period of time or some other
reason, it appears that the respondents and the lower court have
overlooked, ignored or misunderstood the Utah Supreme Court's
holdings in the three 1984 cases cited above. While it is true
that it requires only 20 years of acquiescence to create a
boundary, it wouldn't matter if a fence were in place for five
times that (as is almost true in the present case), or even a
hundred times that, the extra number of years simply cannot take
the place of any of the required elements (in this case tne
objective uncertainty element).

In Halliday v. Cluff, supra, the
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fence went back to 1930, also a very long time (more than 50
years), and that didn't deter the Court from ruling in favor of
the record title. One can multiply the 20 year prerequisite
period many times, but if the objective uncertainty element is
missing then there isn't even one year of acquiescence to support
the change of a boundary away from the record title.

That is the

case here - respondents (Ainsworth) are unable to show acquiescence for even one year, and therefore the summary judgment
should be reversed as a matter of law and title restored to the
record owner (Maxfield).
DATED this 20th day of August, 1987.

Respectfully submitted,

u*

David H. Day
Jay V. Barney
DAY & BARNEY
45 East Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84107

Attorneys for Appellants
Conrad G. Maxfiefld and
Utah National Corporation
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Freedom Yocum, Jr. and
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Sandy, Utah 84070
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on this 20th day of August, 1987.
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ADDENDUM

.LED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County, Utah

£ik¥£o7

MAR 23 1987

JOSEPH C. RUST (2835)
KESLER & RUST
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2000 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-9333

By

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STUART STAKER,

:
Plaintiff,

v.

:
:

NOAL D. AINSWORTH, et al.,

:

Defendants,

:

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Civil No- C85-2883

and
NOAL D. AINSWORTH, et al.,

:

Plaintiffs,

:

v.

(Judge Wilkinson)

:

CONRAD G. MAXFIELD, et al.

:

Defendants.

:

The motions of plaintiff Stuart Staker, defendants
Holmes and Jensen, Ainsworth, and plaintiff Conrad Maxfield,
having come on for hearing on the 2nd day of February, 1987, at
the hour of 9:00 a^m. and plaintiff Staker being represented by
his counsel Joseph C. Rust, defendants Holmes and Jensen being
represented by their counsel, Gerald Jensen, defendants Ainsworth
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being represented by their counsel, Mitchell Olsen, defendant
Shane appearing in person and plaintiff Conrad Maxfield being
represented by Conrad Maxfield, David Day, and Jay Barney,
defendants Yocum neither being present nor represented by
counsel, and, the court having theretofore received certain
affidavits from the various parties and the court having reviewed
the same as well as memoranda submitted by counsel, and the court
having heard the arguments of counsel, and the court having
further given counsel an opportunity to submit any additional
affidavits which they considered necessary for a consideration of
the motions for summary judgment, and counsel having indicated in
open court that, with the exception of affidavits of surveyors to
clarify previously submitted affidavits, no further affidavits
were necessary in order for the court to rule on the various
motions for summary judgment, and the court having later received
such affidavits from counsel for Ainsworth and counsel for Conrad
Maxfield, and the court having reviewed the same,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Plaintiff Staker, defendants Ainsworth and

defendants Holmes and Jensen's motions for summary judgment are
granted and the fence lines separating the respective properties
at issue in this case are determined by this court to be the true
and proper boundary lines between the respective parties.
2.

The motion for summary judgment by plaintiff

Maxfield is denied.
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DATED this

%3

day of March, 1987
BY THE COURT:

ATTfcST
H.SX0NH»NDUEY_

oAorable Corner S. Wilkinson
District Court Judge

_
Deputy Clerk

[
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby declare that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing SUMMARY JUDGMENT in Civil No. C852883, postage prepaid, this

(0^

day of March, 1987, to:

Jerrold S. Jensen, Esq.
#9 Exchange Place, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Holmes & Jensen
Freedom Yocum, Jr.
9768 South 300 West
Sandy, Utah 84070
David H. Day, Esq.
DAY & BARNEY
45 East Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Attorneys for Conrad Maxfield
Conrad Maxfield
3609 East Escalde Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Nolan J. Olsen, Esq.
OLSEN & OLSEN
8138 South State Street
Midvale, Utah 84047
Attorneys for Noal E. Ainsworth, Juanita
Ainsworth Fox, David Ainsworth, Lynn
Ainsworth, Jean Ainsworth, Jack
Ainsworth and Beth Ainsworth
James Roger Shane
Elfriede Shane
9755 Wasatch Blvd.
Sandy, Utah
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